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STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an attempt by the plaintiff herein to halt the
proposed sale of city-owned property at First South and State
Streets in Salt Lake City by the defendant Salt Lake City
acting through its Board of Commissioners in accordance
with a proposal made by the Salt Lake City Chamber of
Commerce on behalf of Zions Securities Corporation.
It is common knowledge that a new federal building for
Salt Lake City is being proposed for the site and that the
ultimate purchaser will be the Unted States of America. When
it became generally known that this corner was being considered as a site for a federal building, the Board of Commissioners scheduled a public hearing on December 29, 1959, at
which the question of the adequacy of the structures on this
property was fully and carefully discussed, and it was the
general consensus that such buildings were inadequate and
obsolete. Thereupon, on January 21, I960, the Board of
Commissioners passed a resolution which declared the structures
to be inadequate and obsolete for the present and future needs
of Salt Lake City. The resolution also declared that the facilities should be replaced on a new situs more centrally located
in relation to the other offices of city government.
The Board of Commissioners thereupon determined that
the property should be sold and advertised for bids. Only the
bid of the Chamber of Commerce was received, and such bid
was duly acted upon by the Board of Commissioners and
the contemplated sale of the property is to the Chamber of
Commerce or Zions Securities Corporation for transfer to the
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United States, and it is contemplated that a federal building
will be erected thereon.
The trial court upheld the proposed sale of this property
and the method whereby it was sold'by granting defendants'
motions to dismiss, stating respecting these defendants as
follows:
" . . . Although the sale of the same might have been
handled in a different manner, still Salt Lake City
through its Board of Commissioners and Legal Department handled the matter in the manner in which they
thought proper, and if some other procedure than was
used by them should be used, then the Legislature
should so provide . . ."
These defendants will not attempt to answer individually
all the points raised in appellant's brief, for it is our contention
that all the points raised in appellant's brief are so much
window-dressing to the real issues in this case concerning these
defendants and that these real issues are:
(1) Does the City Board of Commissioners, acting in an
official meeting, have the power to sell city-owned property,
undedicated except by use, for a fair consideration, and, in
particular, can it sell such property when it determines the
property to be inadequate and obsolete?
(2) If this transaction involves the LDS church as plaintiff
alleges, do the members of the Board of Commissioners who
are also LDS church members have an unlawful conflict of
interest in such sale?
(3) Does plaintiff have standing to question the sale of
the said property without alleging a pecuniary detriment to
5
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himself and in any event, does he have standing to question
the method of sale?

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
HAS POWER TO SELL CITY PROPERTY.

POINT II
MEMBERSHIP IN A CHURCH WITH WHOM THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS TRANSACTS BUSINESS
DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO AN UNLAWFUL CONFLICT
OF INTEREST.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING TO QUESTION
THE SALE OF THIS PROPERTY NOR THE METHOD
WHEREBY THE SALE WAS MADE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE SALT LAKE CITY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
HAS POWER TO SELL CITY PROPERTY.
(A) City Property in General.
6
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While it is true that municipal corporations are creatures
of the state and restricted to their express or implied powers,
it is equally true that the cities of this state have been given
broad and sweeping powers over city-owned property.
Section 10-8-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"The boards of commissioners . . . of cities shall have
the power to control the finances and property of the
corporation." (Emphasis added.)
Section 10-8-2, U.C.A. 1853, provides:
"They . . . may purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease,
convey and dispose of property, real and personal, for
the benefit of the city both within and without its corporate boundaries, improve and protect such property,
and may do all other things in relation thereto as natural
persons." (Emphasis added.)
Section 10-8-8, U.C.A. 1953, also provides:
"They may lay out, establish, open, alter, widen,
narrow, extend, grade, pave or otherwise improve
streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, parks,
airports and public grounds, and may vacate the same
or parts thereof, by ordinance." (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff argues in his brief that Section 10-8-8 requires
that a vacating ordinance be passed before city-held property
may be sold. It is the City's contention that the section clearly
states that when property is established by ordinance, it must
be vacated by ordinance. It is clear and natural that the act
abandoning must have equal dignity with the act establishing
and therefore, establishment by ordinance means vacation by
ordinance. The position of the final comma in the statute
makes this clear:
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Cities may "establish . . . public grounds, and may
vacate the same or parts thereof, by ordinance.''
In other words, the same public grounds that have been
established by ordinance may be vacated by ordinance. The
City has power to undo what it has once done. Therefore,
since the property at First South and State Streets was never
dedicated to the use of the municipality by ordinance, resolution
or otherwise, except such dedication as may have arisen from
actual use, the action of the Board of Commissioners in determining to sell such property is of equal dignity with the action
whereby the said board of commissioners devoted the property
to the use of the public, and Section 10-8-8 does not stand
in the way of this sale. Plaintiff seems to contend that an ordinance is required for every act of the City; if this were the
case, the City would be bankrupted by its publishing bill.
Ordinances are required only for the exercise of the legislative
power and to vacate property previously dedicated by ordinance.
Neither does there appear to be any good reason for the
claimed restriction of Section 10-8-2 to property held by the
municipality in a non-governmental capacity. Since the City
is given absolute power to vacate the public use in property
that has been dedicated even by ordinance, it certainly can sell
the same upon the extinguishment of the public use regardless
of the means by which that extinguishment is accomplished.
Two dicta statements in early Utah cases might seem to
indicate a contrary opinion, but in neither of them was the
question decided and in both the matter was not carefully
considered under the present statutes and Constitution of Utah.
In the more recent of the two, McDonald v. Price, 45 Utah
8
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464, 146 Pac. 550, the court held that a specific statute governing the sale of light and power plants prevailed over the
general statutes governing sales of city property. The court
said that the Legislature had the power to prescribe the method
by which the power of the city to sell might be exercised,
and that it could provide this method in respect to all or only
a particular kind of property. As a side comment, the court
said:
" . . . As to property such as streets, alleys, parks,
public buildings and the like, although the title is in
the city, yet such property, it may be said, is held in
trust for strictly corporate purposes, and, as a general
rule, cannot be sold or disposed of so long as it is
being used for the purposes for which it was acquired."
(Emphasis added.)
The court makes no application or reference to the Utah
statutes cited herein because the general rule quoted by the
court is held to be inapplicable. We are willing to admit that
the court correctly states the general rule respecting municipal
property and that municipal property is subject to the control
of the legislature. Rhyne, Municipal Law, Sec. 16-11, Page
379. However, in Utah, the Legislature has spoken and has
given the City authority to sell and dispose of all types of
public property. The cases are unanimous that where cities
are given power by the Legislature to vacate public grounds
in addition to the general authority to sell and convey real
property, the city has complete and plenary power over its
property. The cases from other jurisdictions where this power
has not been granted to cities are not applicable where the
power has been granted. Thus, in McCarter v. City of Raton,
45 N.M. 351, 115 P.2d 90, the question was whether the city

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

could vacate a park and dispose of it. The court held that it
could and stated:
"The contention of appellant is that the City of
Raton holds said property as a trustee for the benefit
and use of the public, and is without authority to
vacate it, or any portion of it, for any purpose; . . .
"By general law, cities in New Mexico were at the
time of the acquisition of said property, and still are,
authorized 'to lay out, establish, open, alter, widen,
extend, grade, pave, or otherwise improve streets,
alleys, avenues, sidewalks, parks, and public grounds,
and vacate the same . . .
"We need not go into the question of what the
authority of the city would have been in the absence
of such a statute. Appellant cites numerous decisions as
supporting his contention. None is authority on the
question here to be decided because none involves
application to similar facts of a statute authorizing
municipalities to vacate parks. . . " (Emphasis added.)
That this is the unanimous rule where a similar statute
exists appears in the case of Lloyd v. City of Great Falls, 107
Mont. 442, 86 P.2d 395, by the cases cited therein which are
to the same effect. See also Carson v. State, 240 Iowa 1178, 38
N.W.2d 168.
The statement in the other Utah case that might concern
the court is the statement of Judge Zane in Ogden City v.
Bear Lake and River Water-Works and Irrigation Co., 16
Utah 440, 52 Pac. 697, wherein, speaking for himself only
and not for the court, he stated:
"But property devoted to a public use cannot be sold
or leased without special statutory authority.'' (Emphasis added.)
10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The confusion in this case probably stems from the fact
that the case was initiated before statehood, since it is clear
that this statement was not well considered in the reflected
light of the Utah Constitution and statutes adopted after
statehood. The Utah Constitution, by Article VI, Section 26,
prohibits "special statutory authority" in this field. It states:
"The Legislature is prohibited from enacting any
private or special laws in the following cases: . . .
vacating . . . public grounds . . . "
To require special statutory authority as Judge Zane
would appear to require is to demand an impossibility and the
foregoing statement of Judge Zane should be completely overruled. The court should not blindly follow such a completely
unworkable dicta statement from one judge and if it does,
the stinging rebuke of the stanza of the poet William Cowper's
"Tirocinium" would be applicable:
"The slaves of custom and established mode,
With packhorse constancy we keep the road,
Crooked or straight, through quags and thorny dells,
True to the jingling of our leader's bells.
So follow foolish precedents, and wink
With both our eyes, is easier than to think."
quoted from the State of Montana ex rel Tripp v. District
Court, 130 Mont. 574, 305 P.2d 1101, (dissenting opinion).
It is clear that the Legislature of Utah has given the
broadest power possible to cities to sell and convey property.
The present power granted by the Legislature provides that
cities can vacate public grounds and may "Sell, lease, convey
and dispose of property, real and personal, for the benefit of
11
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the city . . . and may do all other things in relation thereto as
natural persons."
Certainly the Legislature, by its language, intended the
City to have the complete control over its property and that
result is as it should be. Why should the Legislature, which
is responsible not only to citizens of Salt Lake City but also
to citizens of other parts of the state, exercise greater control
over Salt Lake City property than the Salt Lake City Board
of Commissioners, which is responsible only to the citizens
of Salt Lake City in the exercise of its control of city property ?
Nowhere in the statutes of the State is there any restriction
on the method whereby property of the nature under discussion
must be sold. Consequently, it is for the Board of Commissioners to decide how it will exercise its powers concerning
the sale of property and for plaintiff to contend that the
sale of the property must be consummated in a certain manner
is to substitute the judgment of an individual taxpayer for
the judgment of a duly elected and constituted Board of
Commissioners of Salt Lake City.
In addition, the sale of the properties involved in this
action for a fair consideration by the City is not the disposition
of trust property, but is merely an exchange by the City of
trust estates and is an exchange that the elected officials of the
City feel is in the best interest of the citizens of Salt Lake
City. If the citizens disapprove of the sale of this property,
they can reflect their displeasure at the polls, but the court
should not interfere with municipal government in the face
of such clear and unambiguous authorizing legislation as is
set forth herein.
12
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In Miller v. City of Pasco, 50 Wash. 2d 229, 310 P.2d
863, the court held that a statute providing that cities might
"control and dispose of it (property) for the common benefit,"
gave the city the power to sell a park. The court held that the
words "dispose of" were to be given their usual and ordinary
meaning. The court also held that since the city had been
given no general authority to lease property, a specific statute
authorizing the sale or lease of this particular piece of property
was unconstitutional special legislation.
In 141 A.L.R., Page 1459, the author states:
"In other cases holding that a municipality may
properly sell its real property under a general grant of
power to acquire, hold or convey property, no distinction has been made as to whether the property was
held in a governmental capacity or was devoted to
public use and typical of cases of this nature are
Matthews v. Darby (1928), 165 Ga. 509, 41 S.E. 304
(city hall); Shaves v. Salisbury (1873), 63 N.E. 29
(town hall and public square); Thompson v. Nemeyer
(1899), 50 Ohio St. 486, 52 N.E. 1024 (gas plant);
Verlin Bros Co. v. Toledo (1900), 20 Ohio CC 603,
11 Ohio C D . 56 (gas plant)."
To this list may be added Carter v. City of Greenville, 175
S. Car. 130, 178 S.E. 508, (1935), (city hall).
(B) Obsolete and Inadequate Property in Particular.
What has been said in respect to all city property applies
to an even greater degree to property that has become inadequate and obsolete.
Even without the specific authority given by Section
10-8-8, U.C.A. 1953, supra, it is the general rule of law that
13
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the public trust in governmentally-held property ceases when
the property becomes inadequate and obsolete. This is stated
succinctly in Rhyne's Municipal Laiv, Section 16-11, Page 379:
"The state legislature has complete control over the
sale and distribution of municipal property, subject
only to constitutional provisions relating to local and
special legislation. It is the general rule that in the
absence of charter or statutory authority, municipal
property dedicated and being used for a governmental
purpose, or held in trust may not be sold by a municipality . . . However, it is an equally well-settled proposition that property which has outlived its usefulness,
or which has become inadequate for the public purpose
to which it had formally been dedicated . . . may be
sold by a municipality without specific legislative
authority, under a general grant of statutory or charter
authority to hold and to convey property.'' (Emphasis
added.)
In the case of Marshall v. Mayor, etc., of City of Meridian,
103 Miss. 206, 60 So. 135, the court held that an old city hall
could be sold even though its use had not in fact yet ceased
when provision had been made for building a new city hall.
The court said:
"In the absence of legislative authority, a municipal
corporation is without power to sell or dispose of
property held by it for governmental purposes. By the
city's charter, appellees are empowered to 'purchase
and hold real, personal and mixed property, and may
dispose of the same for the benefit of said city.' This
provision of the charter clearly gives appellees power
to sell property under some circumstances. It may be
that this general grant of power carries with it no
authority to sell property held and used for governmental purposes, as to which we express no opinion;
14
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but when such property has ceased to be used for such
purposes, the reasons for the rule prohibiting the
sale thereof cease, so that the rule itself ceases, and
thereafter it can be sold under this general power to
sell. There can be no question that, under a general
grant of power to sell, a city has the power to sell
property which it owns not charged with a trust. In
the case at bar the only trust charged upon the property,
other than the general trust under which all municipal
property is held, is that which results from its being
dedicated to a public use, and when this use shall lawfully cease this trust will cease also. It is true that the
use of this property for public purposes has not in
fact ceased, but provision has been made for the building of a new city hall and the sale of the old city hall
is but a preliminary thereto, and in aid thereof, and
when the new city hall is built, the use of the old will
cease.
"Where a city is empowered to build a new city hall,
and the money which can be realized from a sale of its
old hall will be of material aid in so doing, it ought
to have power to sell its old hall for that purpose, and
we are aware of no good reason for holding that it
has not!' (Emphasis added.)
Judge Zane, in Ogden City v. Bear Lake and River WaterWorks & Irrigation Co., supra, although mistaken in his statement concerning special legislation, recognizes the right and
necessity for the city to be able to dispose of obsolete and
inadequate property when he states:
"Public buildings may become unfit for public use,
and for sufficient reasons the city may not wish to build
upon the same lot; and such buildings, and the lots
upon which they stand, may be no longer used by
the public. The city from time to time may have other
classes of property that has ceased to be used, or is
15
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not used by the public. All such property of a municipal
corporation, not devoted to the public use, may be sold
or leased under the general authority to sell or lease,
as the public welfare may demand. Such property may
be converted into money or other things, and in that
form devoted to the use of the public."
The determination of the city to sell is not subject to
judicial review in the absence of fraud or bad faith, neither
of which has been alleged. In Board of Revenue of Etowah
County v. Hutchins, 250 Ala. 173 33 So.2d 737, the city needed a
new jail and courthouse and decided not to build on the old
site. The court said:
"It [the Board of Revenue] therefore had authority
to direct and control the property of the county as it
may deem expedient according to law, . . . to erect and
to keep in order and repair the buildings of the county
at county expense . . . and to erect courthouses, jails,
and hospitals and other necessary county buildings,
"When acting within the limits fixed by law and the
constitution, the authority of the board over the particular matter in question ivas all-encompassing. It
was within its exclusive discretion to determine the
necessity for a new courthouse and jail and the proper
place within the county seat for its location. In making
this determination the board acted in a quasi-legislative
capacity and in the absence of fraud, corruption, or
unfair dealings that action is not subject to judicial
control or revision.

" . . . the board of revenue was within its authority
to enter into a binding contract for the sale of the
present courthouse site, no bad faith attending the
16
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transaction. The contract to sell the old property was
a part of the plan of obtaining a new courthouse and
jail . . . This likewise was a matter consecrated to
the discretion of the managing board of the county and
unless it were shown that the discretion has been
arbitrarily exercised and bad faith entered into the
action it cannot be challenged.
* 'While a municipality has no implied power to alien
or dispose of property dedicated to or held in trust for
the public use, . . . ordinarily its property abandoned
from public use or not devoted thereto may be disposed
of by the managing authorities when acting in good
faith and without fraud.
r(

. . . It would be a legal casuistry to extract from
the statute an interpretation that would require the
postponement to a probably unpropitious time the execution of a contract for the disposal of the old property
when complete plans had been put under way for the
procurement of a new facility and the abandonment
of the old one." (Emphasis added.)
In Schutz v. City Council of City of New England, N. Dak.,
61 N.W.2d 423, the court said:
"It is well settled that The discretionary powers of
municipal authorities will not be interfered with in a
suit by a taxpayer for an injunction in the absence of
fraud or palpable abuse/
To the same effect of both these points are the following
authorities: Pioneer Inv. & Trust Co. v. Board of Education,
35 Utah 1, 99 Pac. 150; Griffis v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Via.,
104 So. 2d 33; Kirkland v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 824, 76 S.E. 2d
396; Blaser v. Dalles City, 171 Ore. 441, 137 P.2d 991; Miller
v. City of Pasco, 50 Wash. 2d 229, 310 P.2d 863; Fussell17
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Graham-Alderson Co. v. Forrest City, 145 Ark. 375, 224 S.W.
745; Reed v. Village of Hibbing, 150 Minn. 130, 184 N.W.
842; Babin v. City of Ashland, 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E. 2d
580; Carson v. State, 240 Iowa 1178, 38 N.W. 2d 168; City of
New Orleans v. Louisiana Society, 229 La. 246, 85 So. 2d 503;
Dix v. Port of Port Orford, 131 Ore. 157, 282 Pac. 109; Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. City of Lexington, 299 Ky. 510,
186 S.W. 2d 201; Ravenelle v. City of Woonsocket, 73 R.I.
270, 54 A.2d 376; Hermann v. City of Lake Mills, 275 Wis.
537, 82 N.W.2d 167; Seafeldt v. Port of Astoria, 141 Ore.
418, 16 P.2d 943; Haesloop v. City Council of Charleston, 123
S. Car. 272, 115 S.E. 596; Hall v. City & County of Denver,
115 Colo. 538, 177 P.2d 234.
Certainly the determination of the Board of Commissioners
that these properties are inadequate and obsolete is not infused
with the fraud, bad faith or palpable abuse of discretion
necessary to invoke the conscience of equity, and to require
this court to void the sale of this property.

POINT II
MEMBERSHIP IN A CHURCH WITH WHOM THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS TRANSACTS BUSINESS
DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO AN UNLAWFUL CONFLICT
OF INTEREST.
McQuillin, in Municipal Corporations, Section 29.97, Page
390, states:
'The interest of an officer which will render void a
contract with a city, is a present, personal, and pecuniary
interest."
18
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In the case of Furlong v. South Park Commissioners, 350
111. 363, 172 N.E. 757, the claimed disqualifying interest was
that five members of the park commission were to be trustees of
a museum corporation, a non-profit corporation with whom
the park commissioners were contracting. The court held that
the agreement was not in violation of the corrupt practices
act and said:
" I n general, the disqualifying interest must be of a
pecuniary or proprietary nature.' And it is said in 44
Corpus Juris, 93: 'An interest to invalidate the contract must be of a personal or private nature, so that
an interest incident to a membership in a corporation
organized for the public welfare, and not for profit,
will not have that effect/
See
70 P.2d
24 P.2d
28 N.E.
Dist. R.

also Quackenbush v. City of Cheyenne, 52 Wyo. 146,
577; Mumma v. Town of Brewster, 11A Wash. 112,
458;Panozzo v. City of Kockford, 306 111. App. 443,
2d 748; Crawford v. Clifton Heights, (1901), 11 Pa.
630, 140 A.L.R, 349.

Certainly members of the Board of Commissioners do
not have to live in a complete vacuum. They can be members
of churches and have dealings with those churches. Otherwise,
only atheists who were complete social outcasts and owed
allegiance to no one could hold public office. The complete
absurdity of plaintiff's position in respect to conflicts of interest
is illustrated by the fact that no case in point has ever arisen
even though statutes and the common law have prohibited
conflicts in interest for centuries. All of plaintiff's cited cases
involve some sort of pecuniary interest; some involve an immediate interest, some a remote interest, but all involve a pecuniary
interest nevertheless.
19
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POINT III.
PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING TO QUESTION
THE SALE OF THIS PROPERTY NOR THE METHOD
WHEREBY THE SALE WAS MADE.
This property was sold after appraisal for a fair consideration. Plaintiff has failed to allege wherein he, as a taxpayer,
will suffer as a result of this sale. That he must allege and
prove pecuniary loss in order to have standing in court is
universally recognized.
In the case of Henderson v. McCormick, 70 Ariz. 19, 215
P.2d 608, the city made a sale of a truck to a person with whom
a city officer had an admittedly unlawful interest in the contract.
However, it appeared the buyer paid as much or more than
the truck was worth. The court said a taxpayer's action could
not be maintained, and stated:
"The authorities universally uphold the rule that a
taxpayer may maintain an action only when such taxpayer, and taxpayers as a class, have sustained or will
sustain pecuniary loss.

"There is unanimity in the authorities that where the
plaintiffs as taxpayers, or the taxpayers as a class,
sustain no injury, a court of equity is powerless to
grant relief . . .
"The suit was improvidently brought by plaintiffs
and to uphold the judgment of the lower court would
encourage disgruntled citizens to resort to the courts
in the guise of taxpayers' suits, thereby, in effect, taking
over and throttling the administration of municipal
affairs." (Emphasis added.)
20

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

To the same effect is Quackenbush v. City of Cheyenne,
supra, and see also Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 P.2d
818, wherein this court said:
" . . . the various courts have always required an
allegation and a showing that the taxpayer is subject
to some pecuniary loss . . . The attack alleged is not
that the expenditures, if made, will be for unlawful
or illegal purposes, but rather for legitimate state
services. In all of the cases cited, it will be noted
that there was illegality in the purpose of the appropriation, not irregularities in the manner of making
the money available."
This plaintiff has failed to allege or offered to prove any
pecuniary loss and this alone defeats his right to this action.
To an even greater extent, plaintiff has no standing to
question the method employed by the Board of Commissioners
to effect this sale. The authorities cited herein under Point I
(B) and especially the cases of the Board of Revenue of
Etowah County v. Hutchins, supra, and Schutz v. City Council
of City of New England, supra, are clear that the court will
not interfere with the actions of governmental bodies in the
absence of fraud or palpable abuse, neither of which has been
alleged. Plaintiff cannot, in the guise of a taxpayer suit, decide
the method of operation of municipal affairs. Even if he can
attack the right of the Board of Commissioners to sell city
property, he cannot attack the procedure adopted by the Board
of Commissioners in selling the same.
There is absolutely no justification for plaintiff's contentions that the sale should have proceeded in a certain manner.
Mandatory requirements must be made by the Legislature
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and none have been made in Utah. The Legislature has seen
fit to give the Board of Commissioners the complete power
over city property and the only requirements set forth in the
statutes are that formal action of the commission must be done
openly and that a majority of a quorum of commissioners must
concur.
CONCLUSION
From all that has been stated, it is clear that the City had
full authority to sell the property in question, that plaintiff
has no standing to question its sale, and that no unlawful
conflict of interest bars the Board of Commissioners from
doing business with Zions Securities Corporation or for that
matter with the LDS Church. The trial court's dismissal of
the first cause of action should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES L. BARKER, JR.
City Attorney
NORMAN W. KETTNER
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents Salt Lake City Corporation, /. Bracken Lee, foe L.
Christensen, L. C. Romney, T.
L Geurts and /. K. Piercey, its
Commissioners,
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